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A. INTRODUCTION 
The Companies Act 2006 (“the Act”) received Royal Assent in the UK on 8 
November 2006. With 1,300 sections and 16 schedules, the Act is the largest act 
every passed by the UK Parliament. In January 2007, the UK Government indicated 
that the lion’s share of the Act would be brought into force in three tranches, namely 
1
st
 October 2007, 6
th
 April 2008 and 1
st
 October 2008. However, in November 2007, 
the UK Government announced that the implementation of the majority of the 
provisions of the Act which they had envisaged bringing into force on 1
st
 October 
2008 would be postponed to 1
st
 October 2009. Since the Act received Royal Assent, 
there have been seven commencement orders.  
One of the main reforms introduced by the Act was the introduction of a statutory 
statement of the law of directors’ duties. The relevant sections of the Act are sections 
171-187 and 190-196. Sections 171-174, 178-181 and 190-196 of the Act came into 
force on 1
st
 October 2007, whereas sections 175-177 and 182-187 of the Act came 
into force on 1
st
 October 2008. With the exception of sections 174, 182-187 and 190-
196 of the Act, all of the duties are fiduciary in nature. Moreover, sections 178-187 
and 190-196 are technically speaking not ‘directors’ duties’, but are covered here 
since they regulate self-dealing between directors and the company. 
The purpose of this presentation is to provide a detailed treatment of the law of 
directors’ duties in the UK. Throughout the discussion, an attempt will be made to 
place the rules in their historical and comparative perspective. Moreover, 
consideration will be given to the principal means of enforcement of the directors’ 
duties in the UK, namely: - 
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(a)  the new statutory derivative proceedings contained in sections 260-269 
of the Act; and  
(b)  section 994 of the Act (the minority shareholders’ ‘unfair prejudice’ 
remedy). 
B. REFORM OF THE LAW OF DIRECTORS’ DUTIES 
Introduction 
Traditionally, the law of directors’ duties was regulated by the common law in the 
UK. That is to say the body of rules in the UK which were built up by the judiciary 
through incremental decision-making taken in like cases over a long period of time 
which were then forged into a formal source of law through the doctrine of judicial 
precedent (stare decisis). The law of directors’ duties was carved by the judiciary over 
the course of the 1800s and 1900s by transplanting and adapting the existing law on 
the duties of trustees. To that extent, directors were equated with trustees by the 
common law and the duties of the directors were developed by analogy with the 
duties of trustees – which may have not been the perfect analogy since the 
overarching duty of the trustee in the law of equity is to preserve and conserve the 
assets of the trust, whereas in the case of the director of a company, it is the purpose 
of the director to engage in risk-taking with the assets of the company.
1
  
In terms of the common law, the general duties of directors were divided into the duty 
of loyalty and the duty of care, skill and diligence. The former was a fiduciary duty, 
whereas the latter was not since it was concerned about the competence or negligence 
of directors. Moreover, the fiduciary duty of loyalty could be divided into the 
following sub-duties each of which themselves had eminent lines of case authority to 
further ‘flesh’ out their content and scope: - 
• The duty to act bona fide in what the director considered to be the interests of 
the company;
2
 
                                                 
1
 See Professor Sealy’s criticisms in his seminal article, “The Director as Trustee” 
[1967] Cambridge Law Journal 83. 
2
 Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd. [1942] Ch. 304, 306 per Lord Greene M.R. 
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• The duty not to act for any collateral purpose, i.e. that powers delegated to a 
director pursuant to the constitution must be used by the director for their 
proper purposes and not as a means of upsetting the constitutional balance of 
power settled in the constitution between the directors and the shareholders;
3
 
• The duty not to fetter their discretion;4 
• The duty to avoid placing themselves in a position where their duties and their 
personal interests conflict;
5
 
• The duty to avoid making a profit from their position as a director;6 and 
• The duty to avoid exploiting or misusing corporate information, contracts, 
property or opportunities.
7
 
One of the advantages of the law of directors’ duties being articulated through the 
common law system was that it could be adapted and modernised in light of changing 
commercial and economic conditions. In other words, the law would not stand still 
and was inherently flexible, permitting the judiciary to mould the law by a process of 
retrenchment and expansion of the categories of duties (and the circumstances in 
which the duties would be invoked and breached) as requirements demanded. The 
duties were expressed at a high level of generality, ensuring that the development of 
the common law was intrinsically dynamic.
8
 However, a particular difficulty with the 
law was that it was inaccessible to those to whom it was addressed, i.e. directors. 
Other than obtaining legal advice from practising lawyers in the UK, directors had no 
way of knowing what their duties were in law which they owed to the company. For 
this principal reason of a lack of transparency, the UK Government agreed with the 
                                                 
3
 Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd. [1967] Ch. 254 and Howard Smith Ltd. v Ampol Petroleum 
Ltd. [1974] A.C. 821 (Privy Council). 
4
 Fulham Football Club Ltd. v Cabra Estates plc [1994] 1 BCLC 363. 
5
 Aberdeen Railway Co. v Blaikie Bros (1854) 1 Macq 461; 
6
 Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134n; [1942] 1 All ER 378, HL. 
7
 Cook v Deeks [1916] 1 AC 554, PC (misusing corporate property/assets by diverting 
a lucrative contract from the company to another company which the directors formed 
and controlled),   
8
 See the obiter dicta of Lady Justice Arden in Item Software (UK) Ltd. v Fassihi 
[2005] 2 BCLC 91, 103-104 at paras. [41]-[43]. 
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Company law Review Steering Group,
9
 the Law Commission
10
 and the Scottish Law 
Commission
11
 that the common law should be replaced by a written statutory 
statement of the legal duties of directors in a new Companies Act. In particular, the 
Company Law Review Steering Group had the following to say in its Final Report in 
2001: - 
“The case for and against providing a clear restatement of directors’ duties has 
been examined by the Law Commissions and has been set out by us in 
Developing the Framework
12
 and Completing the Structure.
13
  We continue to 
recommend such a legislative statement. We do so for three main reasons: 
 
                                                 
9
 A body which was specifically set up by the Government to review company law 
and report on its reform. 
10
 The Law Commission is a statutory body whose role it is to keep English law up to 
date and advise Government on its reform. See the Law Commission Report (Law 
Com 261; Scot Law Com 173; Cm4436), “Company Directors; Regulating Conflicts 
of Interests and formulating a Statement Duties” which is a joint report by the Law 
Commission and the Scottish Law Commission published in 1999 on their 
recommendations for the reform of the law of directors’ duties – available at 
http://www.lawcom.gov.uk/docs/lc261(1).pdf. 
11
 The Scottish Law Commission is a statutory body whose role it is to keep Scots law 
up to date and advise Government on its reform. 
12
 This was a report of the Company Law Review Steering Group which preceded its 
Final Report - URN 00/656, available at 
http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/businesslaw/co-act-2006/clr-
review/page25086.html. 
13
 This was a report of the Company Law Review Steering Group which preceded its 
Final Report - URN 00/1335, available at 
http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/businesslaw/co-act-2006/clr-
review/page25080.html. 
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- it will provide greater clarity on what is expected of directors and make the law 
more accessible. We believe that this will in turn help to improve standards of 
governance… 
 
- it will enable defects in the present law to be corrected in important areas 
where it no longer corresponds to accepted norms of modern business practice: 
this is particularly so in relation to the duties of conflicted directors and the 
powers of the company in respect of such conflicts… ; and 
 
- it is a key element in addressing the question of “scope” – i.e. in whose 
interests should companies be run – in a way which reflects modern business 
needs and wider expectations of responsible business behaviour. 
… 
The need for clear, accessible and authoritative guidance for directors on which 
they may safely rely, on the basis that it will bind the courts and thus be 
consistently applied, combined with the need to clarify the law in the areas of 
uncertainty and to make good the defects, makes us all the more convinced that 
the case for a legislative restatement of directors’ duties, or codification, is well 
founded.”
14
 
The purpose of the law on directors’ duties contained in sections 170 to 177 of the Act 
is twofold: - 
• First, to codify the common law; and 
• Second, to reform the common law. 
The reform objective suggests that it is insufficient to rely on the old law. This is 
despite the terms of section 170(3) and (4) which provide as follows: - 
“(3) The general duties are based on certain common law rules and equitable 
principles as they apply in relation to directors and have effect in place of 
those rules and principles as regards the duties owed to a company by a 
director. 
                                                 
14
 “Modern Company law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report” at pages 40-41. 
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(4) The general duties shall be interpreted and applied in the same way as 
common law rules or equitable principles, and regard shall be had to the 
corresponding common law rules and equitable principles in interpreting and 
applying the general duties.” 
The Explanatory Notes to the Act state the following: - 
“… subsection (3) of section 170 provides that the statutory duties are based 
on, and have effect in place of, certain common law rules and equitable 
principles… subsection (4) of section 170 provides that the general duties 
should be interpreted and applied in the same way as common law rules and 
equitable principles. The courts should interpret and develop the general duties 
in a way that reflects the nature of the rules and principles they 
replace…subsection (4) of section 170 also provides when interpreting and 
applying the statutory duties, regard should be had to the common law rules 
and equitable principles which the general duties replace; thus developments 
in the law of trusts and agency should be reflected in the interpretation and 
application of the duties.”
15
 
Notwithstanding these statutory provisions and the proclamations in the Explanatory 
Notes, one’s suspicion is that there are two reasons for being wary of relying on the 
old law. First, it is clear that the list of duties does not offer a complete codification of 
the existing rules. This is partly due to simple gaps (such as the common law on (i) 
the misappropriation of assets and (ii) the duty of directors to consider the interests of 
creditors when insolvency is threatened, which are not separately addressed)
16
 and 
partly due to the nature of the duties in question. Second, the stated duties in the Act 
clearly go further than a simple restatement of the common law – section 172 of the 
Act is a prime example. Indeed, it is perhaps better to take a selective approach, 
whereby one treats the common law as being marginalised for the purposes of section 
172, but that it may continue to command force as an interpretive tool in connection 
with sections 171, 173 and 174. 
                                                 
15
 Para. 305. 
16
 In relation to these two issues – the ‘old’ common law will continue to apply. 
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Commentators have mused about the effect of the divergent objectives of the Act, 
namely codification and reform, remarking that a rush of litigation may ensue as a 
means of adding meaning and substance to the sections. In the end, the new law on 
directors’ duties may mirror the old law. However, this is mere speculation at this 
stage. What is clear is that there is a tension between the twin aims of codification and 
reform, with the result perhaps being lesser clarity.  
Another tension inherent within the statutory statement of directors’ duties is that 
which exists between the Government’s intention of securing (a) greater clarity and 
(b) flexibility. For example, the search for clarity has sometimes resulted in the duties 
being stricter than the common law, whether because of the content of the duties or 
the greater ease with which they are to be enforced (via the vehicle of the statutory 
derivative claim). Meanwhile, the demand for flexibility has resulted in certain 
provisions which are better suited to businesses, enabling them to authorise certain 
breaches, e.g. conflicts of interest. 
Interpreting the Director’s Duties  
Since the directors’ duties are contained in a new Act of Parliament, there will 
undoubtedly be difficulties and uncertainties as to how certain provisions ought to be 
construed. It is probably fair to say that the content, scope, nature and extent of the 
directors' duties are likely to be the provisions in the Act which generate the most 
disputes and litigation in practice. The main reason for this is that the duties are 
expressed at an extremely high level of generality. 
The codification of the directors’ duties in the Act is the culmination of 10 years’ 
work by the Law Commission, The Company Review Steering Group, the 
Government and Parliament. Thus, in the case of a particular dispute concerning 
whether a director has breached his duties, the materials produced by each of these 
organisations will require to be closely dissected. Unfortunately, the degree and range 
of the interpretative documentation and the output of these bodies is truly staggering 
and the following documents will demand consultation: - 
• Statement by Margaret Hodge, Minister of State for Industry and the Regions, 
giving guidance on directors’ duties - the bulk of the ministerial statement 
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consists of selected (edited) extracts from Hansard which have been chosen to 
assist interpretation of the codified duties. See 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file40139.pdf. 
• The Explanatory Notes to the Act (available at 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts.htm);  
• Statements on the Bill as it progressed which are published in Hansard; 
• The DTI Guidance Notes on the Bill – which are the ‘old’ Explanatory Notes 
to the Bill; 
• The Reports of the Company Law Review Steering Group, namely 
Developing the Framework,
17
 Completing the Structure
18
 and its Final 
Report;
19
 
• The Law Commission Report (Law Com 261; Scot Law Com 173; Cm4436), 
“Company Directors; Regulating Conflicts of Interests and formulating a 
Statement Duties”; and 
• The UK Government White Papers 2002 and 2005. 
What Philosophy Underpins the Duties? 
This is really a discourse about a pivotal question which is endemic to the entirety of 
corporate law, namely ‘in whose interests should corporations be managed and run?’  
The philosophy of ‘shareholder primacy’ was the traditional response of the common 
law, as espoused in classic cases such as Percival v Wright
20
 and Parke v Daily News 
                                                 
17
 This was a report of the Company Law Review Steering Group which preceded its 
Final Report - URN 00/656, available at 
http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/businesslaw/co-act-2006/clr-
review/page25086.html. 
18
 This was a report of the Company Law Review Steering Group which preceded its 
Final Report - URN 00/1335, available at 
http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/businesslaw/co-act-2006/clr-
review/page25080.html. 
19
 “Modern Company law for a Competitive Economy: Final Report” June 2001. 
20
 [1902] 2 Ch. 421. 
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Ltd..
21
 In other words, companies are managed in the interests of the general 
fluctuating body of shareholders, past, present and future, directors owe duties to the 
company rather than any individual shareholder or outside constituency or class, that 
is to say duties are owed to the general fluctuating body of shareholders, past, present 
and future and the objective of the directors in managing the company is the 
maximisation of shareholder wealth. Needless to say, there are a number of criticisms 
which can be levelled at this shareholder primacy philosophy. The principal objection 
is allied to the increasingly important corporate social responsibility agenda and 
lobby, i.e. the agenda which seeks to rein in the considerable social and economic 
power of corporations by enjoining directors to take decisions for the benefit of other 
classes, such as employees. Here, the objection to this rabid wealth enhancement 
approach is that it fails to consider the interests of outside constituencies such as 
employees, creditors, suppliers, the general public and society at large, i.e. it is 
insufficiently pluralistic. In theory, where a director decides to allow toxic fumes to 
escape from the company’s manufacturing factory, so long as that director is of the 
genuine belief that such a decision is in the best interests of the general body of 
shareholders, past, present and future, it is of no consequence that the decision 
resulted in the pollution of another factory adjacent to the company’s premises for the 
purposes of ascertaining breach of duty in company law. Thus, the common law took 
the view that questions of the public good were not for company law to tackle. 
Another criticism of the shareholder primacy model is that it encourages short-term 
risk taking by directors at the expense of long-term corporate growth. 
The alternative approach at the other extreme is the ‘pluralistic’ or ‘stakeholder’ 
approach. A good example of the pluralistic approach is evidenced by section 717(b) 
of the New York Business Corporations Law which is in the following terms: - 
“In taking action, including, without limitation, action which  may involve  or 
relate to a change or potential change in the control of the corporation,  a  director  
shall  be  entitled  to   consider,   without limitation, (1)  both the long-term and 
the short-term interests of the  corporation  and  its  shareholders  and  (2)  the  
effects   that   the  corporation's  actions  may  have  in the short-term or in the 
long-term upon any of the following: 
                                                 
21
 [1962] Ch. 927. 
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(i)  the prospects for potential growth, development, productivity and    
profitability of the corporation; 
 
(ii)  the corporation's current employees; 
 
(iii) the corporation's retired employees and other beneficiaries receiving or 
entitled to receive retirement, welfare or similar benefits from or 
pursuant to any plan sponsored, or agreement  entered  into,  by  the 
corporation; 
 
(iv)  the corporation's customers and creditors; and 
 
(v)   the ability of the corporation to provide, as a going concern, goods, 
services, employment opportunities and employment benefits and 
otherwise to contribute to the communities in which it does business. 
In other words, the interests of outside constituencies who may be affected by 
corporate decision-making which has been taken by directors such as employees, 
customers, creditors, etc. are given the same priority as the company, i.e. the general 
body of shareholders, past, present and future. Thus neither takes priority over the 
other and so the directors must balance each of these considerations equally before 
making a decision. The concern is with the forging of a balance of interests, rather 
than any one particular interest taking precedence over the others.  
Again, there are many objections to this pluralistic philosophy. But the main criticism 
is that any legal recognition of the importance of multiple interests in corporate 
decision-making serves to confuse directors and undermines the legitimacy of the law. 
As Easterbrook and Fischel argued: - 
“A master told to serve two masters… has been freed of both and is 
answerable to neither. Faced with a demand from either group, the manager 
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can appeal to the interest of the other. Agency costs rise and social wealth 
falls.”
22
 
Thus, the effect of requiring a director to take into account the interests of multiple 
constituencies is self-defeating. It merely serves to undermine the whole purpose of 
imposing duties on directors in the first place, that is to say the eradication or 
minimisation of agency costs and self-dealing. 
The UK Government decided to pursue a middle route. This was the ‘enlightened 
shareholder value’ approach. It is described by the Government in the following 
terms: - 
“The Company Law Review considered and consulted on two main options. 
The first was “enlightened shareholder value”, under which a director must 
first act in the way that he or she considers, in good faith, would be most likely 
to promote the success of the company for its members…The Government 
agrees this is the right approach. It resolves any confusion in the mind of 
directors as to what that the interests of the company are, and prevents any 
inclination to identify those interests with their own. It also prevents confusion 
between the interests of those who depend on the company and those of the 
members.”
23
 
““enlightened shareholder value”… recognises that directors will be more 
likely to achieve long term sustainable success for the benefit of their 
shareholders if their companies pay attention to a wider range of 
matters…Directors will be required to promote the success of the company in 
the collective best interest of the shareholders, but in doing so they will have 
to have regard to a wider range of factors, including the interests of employees 
and the environment”
24
 
                                                 
22
 F. Easterbrook and D. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1991) 38. 
23
 Lord Goldsmith, Lords Grand Committee, 6 February 2006, column 255. 
24
 Alistair Darling, Commons Second Reading, 6 June 2006, column 125. 
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The classic exposition of this ‘enlightened shareholder value’ approach is contained in 
section 172(1) of the Act which we consider below. The effect is that the primary duty 
of the directors is to consider that the decision they have taken is in the long-term 
interests of the company, but that the secondary duty owed by the directors is to 
certain outside constituencies. Thus, it is slightly different from the ‘shareholder 
primacy’ philosophy in that greater weight is placed on the importance of long-term 
strategic decision-making and some consideration, albeit secondary consideration, 
must be given to outside constituencies. 
Who Owes the Duties? 
This is fairly straightforward and is addressed in section 170(1) and (5): - 
“(1) The general duties specified in sections 171 to 174 are owed by a director 
of a company to the company… 
(5) The general duties apply to shadow directors where, and to the extent that, 
the corresponding common law rules or equitable principles so apply.” 
Hence, de facto and shadow directors owe the duties. 
To Whom are the Duties Owed? 
See section 170(1) of the Act above. In other words, the duties are owed to the 
company as a whole, rather than the shareholders. Thus, only the company may 
enforce the duties – despite the outside constituencies identified in section 172(1) of 
the Act (director’s duty to promote the success of the company and have regard to the 
interests of others). However, section 172(3) of the Act provides that a director may 
owe duties to creditors in certain circumstances when it states: - 
“(3) The duty imposed by this section [i.e. the duty of a director to act in the 
way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success 
of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole] has effect subject to 
any enactment or rule of law requiring directors, in certain circumstances, to 
consider or act in the interests of creditors of the company.” 
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Thus, in the context of duties owed by directors to creditors, the common law will 
continue to apply. 
Which Duties are Fiduciary in Nature? 
Interestingly, unlike the common law, the statutory statement of directors’ duties does 
not make a distinction between duties which are (i) fiduciary and (ii) non-fiduciary in 
nature. The reason for this is cited in the Company Law Review Steering Group’s 
Report entitled Completing the Structure as follows: - 
“The majority of responses took the view that there was no value in defining 
the duties as “fiduciary” so long as the intention of achieving substantial 
continuity with the present law is achieved. We accept this view… We believe 
that the relevant provisions can be drafted so that general principles of 
statutory interpretation will ensure that to the extent that they enact the 
common law the existing authorities will be capable of being invoked to 
explain the nature of the duties which they codify.”
25
 
Notwithstanding the lack of any distinction between fiduciary and non-fiduciary 
duties in the Act, it is extremely important to know within which of the fiduciary/non-
fiduciary camps the duties fall. This is so, since if the duty is fiduciary, the remedies 
will be more extensive, since an aggrieved party will be able to seek an account of 
profits, i.e. gain-based damages. Not so in the case of a non-fiduciary duty. For this 
reason, the duties which are fiduciary in nature have been marked out in each of the 
headings below. 
Duty No. 1: Section 171 Duty to Act within the Company’s Powers – Fiduciary Duty 
Section 171 of the Act provides that: - 
 “A director of a company must- 
(a) act in accordance with the company’s constitution, and 
(b) only exercise powers for the purposes for which they are conferred.” 
                                                 
25
 Para. 3.12. 
 15 
This duty is unlikely to be of wide application. The ‘company’s constitution’ is 
defined in section 17 of the Act
26
 as (i) the company’s articles of association and (ii) 
any resolutions and agreements to which Chapter 3 of Part 3 of the Act applies. The 
effect of the reference in section 171 of the Act to the ‘company’s constitution’ is that 
there are potential risks for the unwary director who does not follow the progress of 
the decisions of the members by resolution. As for the duty to act for proper purposes, 
this is fact-specific. For example, the proper purpose of a rights issue is to raise 
capital, not to dilute the shareholding of a troublesome shareholder. 
Duty No. 2: Section 172 Duty to Promote the Success of the Company – Fiduciary 
Duty 
This is the overarching fiduciary duty owed by directors by virtue of the Companies 
Act 2006. It replaces the principal common law fiduciary duty to act in good faith in 
the interests of the company as a whole.
27
 Section 172 of the Act provides as follows: 
- 
“(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, 
would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of 
its members as a whole and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to 
– 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
(b) the interests of the company’s employees, 
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others, 
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
environment, 
                                                 
26
 Section 17 does not fully come into force until 1
st
 October 2009, but came into 
force for the purposes of section 171 of the Act with effect from 1
st
 October 2007. 
27
 Having said this, the duty of a company to act in good faith in the interests of the 
company as a whole will continue to be relevant in the case of companies which are 
subject to the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers – see Principle 3 – “The board of 
an offeree company must act in the interests of the company as a whole”. 
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(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards 
of business conduct, and 
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company. 
(2) Where or to the extent that the purposes of the company consist of or 
include purposes other than the benefit of its members, subsection (1) has 
effect as if the reference to promoting the success of the company for the 
benefit of its members were to achieving those purposes.” 
The first point to make is that the subjective element to the director’s decision-making 
found in the common law (see Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd.)
28
 has been retained by virtue 
of the words ‘in the way he considers, in good faith’ in section 172(1) of the Act. At 
common law, in relation to commercial decisions in general, the courts took the view 
that it would be wrong: -  
“to substitute [their] opinion for that of the management, or indeed to question 
the correctness of the management’s decision ... if bona fide arrived at”.
29
 
This common law tradition has been preserved in section 172(1) of the Act. 
Therefore, on the face of these words, as long as the director acts in good faith, what 
matters is the director’s view, not that of the courts – and the courts will be unable to 
substitute their own judgment for that of the director. However, some commentators 
have argued that this is far too simplistic, posing the question as to how far the courts 
will interfere in the ‘good faith’ judgments of directors. There is an argument amongst 
practitioners that the objectivity introduced by section 174 of the Act (which concerns 
                                                 
28
 [1942] Ch. 304, 306 per Lord Greene M.R. 
29
 Howard Smith Ltd. v Ampol Petroleum Ltd. [1974] AC 821, 832 (PC); Re 
Tottenham Hotspur plc [1994] BCLC 655, 660; Runciman v Walter Runciman plc 
[1992] BCLC 1084; and Devlin v Slough Estates Ltd and others [1983] BCLC 497, 
504 per Dillon J: “The court does not interfere with the business judgment of directors 
in the absence of allegations of mala fides”. See also Cheffins, The Theory, Structure 
and Operation of Company Law, (Oxford, OUP, 1997) pp 312-314. 
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the director’s duty to exercise reasonable skill, care and diligence)
30
 may influence 
any examination of ‘good faith’ judgments by directors in connection with the duty to 
promote the success of the company under section 172. With regard to this argument, 
there is much to be sceptical. Duties of care, skill and diligence, which attract a 
mixture and objective and subjective assessments (and rightly so) should not be 
conflated with fiduciary duties (such as the duty to promote the success of the 
company) - and the introduction of objectivity into any assessment as to whether they 
have been breached, in my opinion, is unlikely to curry favour with the courts who 
one suspects will persist in their reluctance to disturb commercial decisions which 
have been taken honestly by directors. Traditionally, the courts have been reluctant to 
interfere in the business decisions of directors unless there is clear dishonesty or the 
decision is plainly an un-commercial decision. One can see no reason why this 
approach will not continue. 
Second, what is meant by ‘success’? When will a director be promoting the ‘success’ 
of the company? Here is what Lord Goldsmith had to say during the passage of the 
Act through Parliament: - 
“What is success? The starting point is that it is essentially for the members of 
the company to define the objective they wish to achieve. Success means what 
the members collectively want the company to achieve. For a commercial 
company, success will usually mean long-term increase in value. For certain 
companies, such as charities and community interest companies, it will mean 
the attainment of the objectives for which the company has been established… 
For a commercial company, success will normally mean long-term increase in 
value, but the company’s constitution and decisions made under it may also 
lay down the appropriate success model for the company… it is essential for 
the members of a company to define the objectives they wish to achieve, the 
normal way for that to be done – the traditional way – is that members do it at 
the time the company is established. In the old style, it would have been set 
down in the company’s memorandum. That is changing… but the principle 
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 “… the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of 
a person carrying out the functions carried out by the director in relation to the 
company…” 
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does not change that those who establish the company will start off by setting 
out what they hope to achieve. For most people who invest in companies, 
there is never any doubt about it – money. That is what they want. They want 
a long-term increase in the company. It is not a snap poll to be taken at any 
point in time… it is for the directors, by reference to those things we are 
talking about – the objective of the company – to judge and form a good faith 
judgment about what is to be regarded as success for the members as a 
whole… they will need to look at the company’s constitution, shareholder 
decisions and anything else that they consider relevant in helping them to 
reach that judgement… the duty is to promote the success for the benefit of the 
members as a whole – that is, for the members as a collective body – not only 
to benefit the majority shareholders, or any particular shareholder or section of 
shareholders, still less the interests of directors who might happen to be 
shareholders themselves. That is an important statement of the way in which 
directors need to look at this judgement they have to make.”
31
 
The above is all well and good, but how a director is expected to ‘promote the success 
of the company’ in circumstances such as a takeover battle (where the current 
members will cease to have an interest going forward) or a winding up (where the 
company will cease to exist) remains clouded in mystery. 
Third, the primary obligation of the director is to promote the success of the company. 
In other words, the interests of the company and its shareholders are paramount and 
the other six or more constituencies identified in subsection (1)(a) – (f) are 
subordinate. Hence, if a director takes a decision which is in the interests of the 
company, but contrary to the interests of one of the other constituencies, the director 
will not be in breach of duty. So long as a director can show that he did actually 
consider these statutory factors, even if he ultimately decided that they were less 
important than other factors, he will probably have discharged his duty. 
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 Lord Goldsmith, Lords Grand Committee, 6 February 2006, columns 255 - 258, 
Hansard. 
 19 
Fourth, there was some debate about what the import of the words ‘have regard to’ in 
section 171(1) were. Here is what Margaret Hodge, UK Government Minister, had to 
say: - 
“The words “have regard to” mean “think about”; they are absolutely not just 
about ticking boxes. If “thinking about” leads to the conclusion, as we believe 
it will in many cases, that the proper course is to act positively to achieve the 
objectives in the clause, that will be what the director’s duty is. In other words 
“have regard to” means “give proper consideration to”… Consideration of the 
factors will be an integral part of the duty to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members as a whole. The clause makes it clear 
that a director is to have regard to the factors in fulfilling that duty. The 
decisions taken by a director and the weight given to the factors will continue 
to be a matter for his good faith judgment.” 
In certain circumstances, it is clear that there will be no need to ‘have regard to’ one 
or all of the six statutory factors. For example, in deciding whether to register the 
transfer of a share, it is unlikely that a director will have to worry about the effect this 
decision will have on the community, environment or employees! So, in some cases, 
some of the factors may be completely irrelevant. However, in having regard to the 
factors listed, the director’s duty in section 174 of the Act to exercise reasonable care, 
skill and diligence will apply. In other words, the director will have to meet the 
requisite standard of care (which is a mixture of objectivity and subjectivity) in 
considering the relevance of the listed factors. It is insufficient to pay lip service to 
these factors without giving the matter any great degree of thought. 
If the directors fail to take into account a relevant factor in deciding to take a 
particular course of action, what are the practical consequences of this 
‘omission’/’breach’? In my opinion, the consequences will be minimal in the majority 
of cases. Why? There are three principal reasons: - 
1. It will be extremely difficult for an aggrieved constituency to discover whether 
their interests were not considered by the director in coming to their decision. 
The current practice of board minutes with minimal coverage of the discussion 
leading up to decisions is likely to continue and to be treated as lawful – see 
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the approach of the GC100
32
 and what they consider to be best practice in light 
of the Companies Act 2006. As a result, barring successful discovery or 
commission and diligence proceedings in relation to briefing papers and other 
documents used by the board to form the decision, an aggrieved employee, 
member of the community, supplier or consumer is unlikely to have any way 
of actually knowing how the directors formed their decisions; and 
2. There is no effective mechanism for a customer, supplier, employee, etc. to 
enforce their interest under section 172. Only the company can enforce the 
duty under section 172 (and all of the duties for that matter). Admittedly, they 
could buy shares in the company if it is listed and then raise statutory 
derivative proceedings under sections 265 to 269, but the court is likely to see 
right through such an attempt and refuse leave to continue with the 
proceedings. Alternatively, they could raise section 994 proceedings by 
petition procedure, but the court is unlikely (in most cases) to grant relief on 
the basis that (i) any ‘unfair prejudice’ occurred prior to the date of the 
acquisition of the shareholding and (ii) they have not been prejudiced by any 
breach of the director’s duty under section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 
qua member, but that they have only suffered unfair prejudice qua employee, 
supplier, customer, member of the community, etc. 
3. Assuming that an aggrieved constituency can overcome the formidable 
obstacles at 1 and 2 above, they will require to demonstrate (i) that the 
decision which the directors took would have been different had their interests 
properly been taken into account and (ii) that the company has suffered loss as 
a result of the decision. Demonstrating (i) will be extremely difficult for 
evidential reasons and in the case of (ii) it will only be in an exceptional case 
that the company will have suffered loss where a director failed to consider the 
interests of the environment, suppliers, customers, employees, etc. in coming 
to a decision, but in taking that decision was convinced, in good faith, that the 
decision which he took was likely to promote the success of the company for 
the benefit of its members as a whole. 
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Thus, at most, it may well be that the importance of the failure of a director to 
consider the interests of such outside constituencies in taking a particular decision will 
be for internal purposes. In other words, a board may seek to take action against a 
director (to whom authority has been delegated for certain decisions) who fails to take 
into account the interests of customers, employees, suppliers, etc. in making a 
decision. 
Fifth, if one looks at the statutory factors, one can see that they are extremely woolly 
concepts. For example, what is meant by the ‘need to foster the company’s business 
relationships with suppliers, customers and others’ and how can a director identify 
this? How is a director to know whether the company’s activities will have an impact 
on the community and the environment and what level of impact is relevant? A 
director is also under an obligation ‘to act fairly as between members of the 
company’. Does this duty require directors to take account of any interest a member 
may have and, if so, how are directors expected to establish what those interests are? 
Are they expected to take account of a member’s rights under the articles, or a 
shareholders’ agreement for that matter? There are real difficulties with these listed 
factors. 
Sixth, what is meant by the words ‘(amongst other matters)’? This appears to mean 
that directors must have regard to all factors relevant to a decision in deciding whether 
a particular course of action will promote the success of the company: - 
“… we have included the words “amongst other matters”. We want to be clear 
that the list of factors [for a director to have regard to] is not exhaustive”.
33
 
The upshot of this is that there is no hierarchy between the six matters set out above – 
and other factors which might have a bearing on the director’s decision – and indeed 
any or all of these statutory and non-statutory factors may conflict in a given case. 
However, it is for the board of directors to consider each of these matters, allocate 
sufficient weight to each of them as they deem appropriate and then decide which 
course of action is most likely to promote the success of the company. 
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Seventh, directors should be clear that one of the factors which they must have regard 
to is the long-term consequences of their decision. This is a departure from the 
common law to an extent which was predominantly concerned with the short-term 
consequences of decisions. The concern is that the Act does not provide any 
explanation to directors on how they are supposed to reconcile long-term and short-
term interests where they are clearly incompatible with each other. A good example is 
provided by Attenborough in an article: - 
“For example, a company in financial difficulties might accept a loan on 
disadvantageous terms, which solves its short-term problems, but this may 
create fresh problems in the long term. This is ostensibly going to be a 
difficult area for directors.”
34
 
Finally, the GC100 Group which represents the general counsel and company 
secretaries of the FTSE 100 companies, has issued guidance
35
 which suggests that 
there is no reason for companies to document the decision-making process in any 
more detail than they currently do and, in particular no need to record negative 
statements in relation to factors considered to  be irrelevant to any given decision. 
This appears to be consistent with the Government’s statement that the Act does not 
require a paper trail to demonstrate that the directors have considered the six listed 
factors.
36
 However, it will important for directors to instil into their general approach 
to board decision-making and the formation of overall strategy a need to recognise 
and bear in mind those factors, and where briefing papers are produced prior to board 
decisions being taken, the contents of such board papers should reflect any one or 
more factors which may be relevant to the decision. Where the board of directors is 
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 See the statement of Lord Goldsmith that ‘[t]here is nothing in the Bill that says 
there is a need for a paper trail… I do not agree that the effect of passing the Bill will 
be that directors will be subject to a breach if they cannot demonstrate that they have 
considered every element. It will be for the person who is asserting breach of duty to 
make that case good…’ (Hansard, 9 May 2006, column 841). 
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taking a key decision to which any one or more of the listed factors is particularly 
relevant (for example, the effect of their decision on a takeover bid on the job 
prospects of a substantial portion of the company’s workforce) or in potentially 
contentious situations or those where, because of the high-profile nature of the 
company or its business, there is likely to be wide scrutiny of the decision, the board 
may need to consider whether to minute the decision with extra care. 
Duty No. 3: Section 173 Duty to Exercise Independent Judgment – Fiduciary Duty 
The ‘new’ duty to exercise independent judgment codifies the current principle of law 
under which directors must exercise their powers independently, without 
subordinating their powers to the will of others, whether by delegation or otherwise 
(unless authorised by or under the constitution to do so). Section 173 is as follows: - 
 “(1) A director of a company must exercise independent judgement. 
 (2)  This duty is not infringed by his acting-  
(a) in accordance with an agreement duly entered into by the company that 
restricts the future exercise of discretion by its directors, or 
 (b) in a way authorised by the company’s constitution.” 
Section 172(2) replaces the common law duty that a director must not fetter his own 
discretion. However, the statutory duty to exercise independent judgment is not 
identical to the common law duty not to fetter one’s discretion. It should be clarified 
that the duty to exercise independent judgment does not confer a power on the 
directors to delegate, nor does it prevent a director from exercising a power to 
delegate conferred by the company’s constitution provided that its exercise is in 
accordance with the company’s constitution. Under the draft model articles of 
association for private companies limited by shares,
37
 the directors may delegate their 
functions in accordance with the articles. 
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A failure to observe this duty can be authorised either by an agreement between the 
company and a third party or the company’s constitution. Thus, the Act recognises 
that there may be circumstances in which the company has bound itself to a course of 
action which may fetter the discretion of the directors in the future and that this will 
not be unlawful (e.g. where a company and the directors enter into an agreement with 
a developer to support, and to refrain from opposing, planning applications by the 
developer for the development of land). It is likely that breaches of section 173 will 
run concurrently with section 172 (the duty to promote the success of the company) 
and section 175 (duty to avoid conflicts of interest) rather than establishing 
freestanding claims. 
Consider nominee directors on the board of a company who vote in accordance with 
the instructions of their appointors. Will such directors be in breach of section 173 of 
the Act when they cast their vote at a board meeting or on a directors’ resolution? 
Probably not, provided proper care is taken. For example, it is likely that 
appropriately crafted contracts (e.g. in the case of a director who is a bank nominee) 
or constitutions (e.g. (i) where a subsidiary company is being formed and a director 
acting as a nominee of the parent company is to sit on the board of the subsidiary and 
act and vote in accordance with the instructions of the parent company or (ii) where a 
joint venture company is being formed and a director acting as a nominee of one of 
the founding companies is to sit on the board of the joint venture company and act and 
vote in accordance with the founding company’s instructions) will deal with the 
relevant issues as a means of avoiding litigation in the case of potential grey areas. 
If a director simply follows external professional advice, will they be able to repel any 
argument that they have not discharged their duty to exercise independent judgment? 
Probably not. In the passage of the Act through Parliament, Lord Goldsmith had the 
following to say about the extent to which a director could rely on professional advice 
in discharging his duty to exercise independent judgment: - 
“… the clause does not mean that a director has to form his judgement totally 
independently from anyone or anything. It does not actually mean that the 
director has to be independent himself. He can have an interest in the matter… 
It is the exercise of the judgement of a director that must be independent in the 
sense of it being his own judgement… The duty does not prevent a director 
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from relying on the advice or work of others but the final judgement must be 
his responsibility. He clearly cannot be expected to do everything himself. 
Indeed, in certain circumstances directors may be in breach of duty if they fail 
to take appropriate advice – for example, legal advice. As with all advice, 
slavish reliance is not acceptable, and the obtaining of outside advice does not 
absolve directors from exercising their judgement on the basis of such 
advice.”
38
 
Duty No. 4: Section 174 Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care, Skill and Diligence – 
Non-fiduciary Duty 
There is no change from the common law in relation to this particular duty. In other 
words, the more rigorous approach to the director’s standard of care in Re D’Jan of 
London Ltd.
39
 has been adopted, comprising a mixture of objective and subjective 
assessments of the director’s conduct. Section 174 provides as follows: - 
“(1) A director of a company must exercise reasonable care, skill and 
diligence. 
(2) This means the care, skill and diligence that would be exercised buy a 
reasonably diligent person with- 
(a) the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be 
expected of person carrying out the functions carried out by the 
director in relation to the company, and 
 (b) the general knowledge, skill and experience that the director has.” 
In the Explanatory Notes to the Act and during the passage of the Act through 
Parliament, it is/was expressly stated that the new law is modelled on the standard for 
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in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. [1925] Ch. 407, 428 – 429 per Romer J, 
which was purely subjective and thus relatively straightforward for a director to 
discharge. 
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the purposes of wrongful trading in section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986.
40
 The 
hypothetical director thus sets the lowest acceptable standard but the actual director’s 
skill, experience, expertise, knowledge and attributes can raise that particular 
threshold. 
In applying their mind to decision-making, directors must bear in mind this duty. In 
other words, this duty will apply in connection with the duty to promote the success of 
the company under section 172 of the Act, i.e. to any good faith assessment as to 
which of the factors are relevant to a business decision and to what extent they need to 
be taken into account. If the good faith assessment turns out to be wrong, the decision 
could be open to challenge if the directors fail either the subjective or the objective 
test in section 174 of the Act, underlining the importance of taking the time to 
consider the list of statutory factors enumerated in section 172 of the Act. 
In the heading to this duty above, it is stated that the duty to exercise reasonable care, 
skill and diligence is not a fiduciary duty. On what basis do is such an assertion 
made? Although it is of no legal effect, the following declaration from the 
Government is instructive (although, of course, the courts will be the final arbiters of 
the status of this duty): - 
“… we take the view that the “duty to exercise reasonable care, skill and 
diligence” is not a fiduciary duty. It may be owed by someone who is a 
fiduciary. But that is not the same thing… it is important to keep to the 
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principle that these are enforceable in the same way as any other fiduciary 
duty owed to the company by its directors.”
41
 
Moreover, section 178(2), which relates to the mechanism for enforcement of a 
breach of the statutory duties provides as follows: - 
“The duties in those sections (with the exception of section 174 (duty to 
exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence)) are, accordingly, enforceable in 
the same way as any other fiduciary duty owed to a company by its directors.” 
Hence, it is expressly provided that section 174 is not enforceable in the same way as 
a fiduciary duty, which suggests that it is not a fiduciary duty. 
The mixed subjective and objective standard applied to the director’s level of care and 
competence in the case of section 174 of the Act can be contrasted with the ‘business 
judgment’ rule which applies in the context of the duty of care and competence in the 
US State of Delaware which we will apply as a proxy for the entire United States of 
America. To recap, it is clear that section 174 of the Act functions in a manner 
whereby the objective test associated with the hypothetical director sets the lowest 
acceptable standard but the director’s actual skill, experience, expertise, knowledge 
and attributes assessed on a subjective basis can raise that particular threshold. Thus, 
the duty of care, skill, competence and diligence in UK law does not entail the 
application of a legal presumption. This can be contrasted with the business judgment 
rule applicable in the US. The business judgment rule can be conceptualised as a 
presumption that a business decision made by a director was reasonable and so 
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non-fiduciary duty. 
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liability will not be established on the part of the director where the claimant suing the 
director cannot demonstrate that, in making the business decision, the director failed 
to act on an informed basis (in the sense that the director arrived at the decision after 
deliberating on the matter, exercising independent judgment and examining all of the 
reasonable facts reasonably available to him at the time of the decision), in good faith 
and in the genuine and honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of 
the company. Hence, the business judgment rule consists of a series of presumptive or 
procedural steps which, if satisfied, relieve the director of liability.
42
  In the situation 
where the director is able to demonstrate that he is (i) disinterested, (ii) independent 
and (iii) informed (i.e. that he has taken the decision after deliberating on the matter, 
exercising independent judgment and examining all of the reasonable facts reasonably 
available to him at the time of the decision) that the director will benefit from the 
application of the presumption.
43
 However, if the presumption is removed, it is 
incumbent on the court to enquire into the fairness of the director’s decision. One of 
the dangers of the business judgment rule in the US – which does not arise in terms of 
the mixed subjective/objective formulation in section 174 of the Act – is that there is a 
tendency to treat a director as presumptively negligent in a cases where he is unable to 
establish that the presumptive standards (of (i) disinterest, (ii) independence and (iii) 
informed decision-making) have been satisfied. 
Duty No. 5: Section 175 Duty to Avoid Conflicts of Interest – Fiduciary Duty 
The UK Government decided to postpone the coming into force of section 175 (duty 
of directors to avoid conflicts of interest) of the Act to 1
st
 October 2008. Section 175 
of the Act must be distinguished from sections 176, 177 and 182-187 of the Act. 
Sections 175 of the Act governs all conflicts of interest which a director may have 
with the exception of: -  
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(a)  a situation where the director is in receipt of a benefit from a third 
party in his/her capacity as a director – this is specifically governed by 
section 176 of the Act;  
 
(b) a situation where the conflict of interest amounts to a proposed 
transaction or arrangement between the director and the company – 
this is specifically governed by section 177 of the Act;
44
  
 
(c) a situation where the conflict of interest amounts to an existing 
transaction or arrangement between the director and the company – 
this is specifically governed by sections 182-187 of the Act;
45
 and 
(d) a situation where the conflict of interest amounts to the director selling 
or acquiring a ‘substantial property’ to or from the company – this is 
specifically dealt with by sections 190-196 of the Act. 
 
Section 175(1) stipulates that a director must avoid a situation in which he has, or can 
have, a direct or indirect interest that conflicts, or possibly may conflict, with the 
interests of the company. The GC100 issued a publication providing guidance on 
directors’ conflicts of interest on 18
th
 January 2008 (see document circulated)
46
 which 
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 Indeed, section 175(3) provides that the duty to avoid a conflict of interest does not 
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 In August 2008, the GC100 also published a members’ pack on directors’ conflicts 
of interest containing (a) a checklist for company secretaries of member companies to 
ensure the directors will be in compliance with the law coming into force on 1
st
 
October 2008, (b) a short briefing note for directors setting out the new statutory duty 
to avoid conflicts of interest and other statutory duties that come into force on 1
st
 
October 2008 and (c) a questionnaire for directors to assist them with the 
identification of conflicts which will require subsequent authorisation by the 
company’s board of directors. 
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provides that ‘an example of an indirect interest would be where a director represents 
a major shareholder in the company whose interests conflict with those of the 
company.’ The Act does not define what is meant by ‘interest’ or ‘conflict of interest’. 
It is suggested that the following are some of the more common examples of conflicts: 
- 
 
• Circumstances in which the director has commercial interests competing with 
those of the company or which may be prejudiced by the company’s activities; 
• The situation of cross or multiple directorships, i.e. circumstances in which a 
director is on the board of a major shareholder of the company (e.g. a holding 
company) or the actual or potential competitor, supplier or client of the 
company; 
• Where a director has a role with one of the company’s advisers or competitors, 
this may amount to a conflict of interest; 
• Circumstances where the director is a significant shareholder in, or is himself, 
a major shareholder or an actual or potential competitor, supplier or client of 
the company; 
• The situation where a director wishes to take up an opportunity which has 
been offered to, but declined by, the company (see below); 
• Where it is unclear in what capacity an opportunity has been offered to a 
director, (i.e. on a personal basis, as a director of the company or as a director 
or shareholder of another company) this may amount to a conflict of interest; 
• Circumstances where the director also acts as a director of the company’s 
pension trustee company or a trustee of the pension fund; 
• Where a director makes personal use of information, property or opportunities 
owned by the company, this may amount to a conflict of interest; 
• Circumstances in which a potential purchaser of the company approaches a 
director and the director is offered a role with the purchaser’s group; 
• The situation where a director makes a profit in the course of being a director 
without the approval or knowledge of the company; and 
• Where, in any of the above situations, the director is a director of another 
company and that other company or a member of the director’s family has the 
relevant relationship with the company or is in the situation described. 
 31 
  
Subsection (2) states that the duty ‘applies in particular to the exploitation of any 
property, information or opportunity (and it is immaterial whether the company could 
take advantage of the property, information or opportunity).’ Thus, the common law 
corporate opportunity doctrine has been codified. The words in parentheses are very 
important. They codify the rule in Regal Hastings (Ltd.) v Gulliver
47
 that any defence 
by a director that the company could not take up the opportunity is not allowed. This 
is perhaps unfortunate as it is arguably bad for the economy that directors are 
deprived from taking advantage of corporate opportunities which, for one reason or 
another, are not available to the companies which they serve. Indeed, it means that the 
economy is ultimately deprived of the benefits arising in terms of productivity from 
the exploitation of the opportunity. Moreover, there is no need for a link between the 
conflict of interest and the influence which the director has over the board, i.e. it is 
immaterial that the director has little influence over decision-making of the board as a 
pre-requisite for a conflict of interest to arise. 
 
The general rule is subject to two exceptions which are listed in section 175(3) of the 
Act, the second of which is the most relevant in practical terms: - 
 
1. if the situation cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict 
of interest, the duty is not breached; and 
2. if the matter has been authorised by the directors in advance, the duty is not 
breached. 
 
In practice, for obvious reasons, directors will be keen to avoid having to rely on 1. 
above. However, before we move on to consider the practically more important 2., it 
is worth considering the effect of 1. on the words in parentheses in section 175(2). 
Here, there seems to be an internal contradiction in the law, since if the company 
cannot take advantage of the property, information or opportunity exploited by the 
director, then surely this ‘cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a 
conflict of interest’ – yet section 175(2) states that the inability of the company to 
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 [1967] 2 AC 134n; [1942] 1 All ER 378. See also Bhullar v Bhullar [2003] 2 
BCLC 241, 256 at para. [41] per Jonathan Parker LJ where the same point is made. 
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exploit that property, information or opportunity is not ‘immaterial’. There is an 
argument that this makes no sense at all, although one could argue that much depends 
on what is meant by ‘conflict of interest’ which, as we have seen, is not defined in 
section 175 of the Act. 
 
Moving on to 2. above, for the purposes of private companies, the effect of the 
combination of section 175(5)(a) of the Act and paragraph 47(3) of Schedule 4 to the 
Companies Act 2006 (Commencement No. 5, Transitional Provisions and Savings) 
Order 2007 (SI 2007/3495) (“the Fifth Commencement Order”) is that a distinction 
must be made between companies incorporated before 1
st
 October 2008 and those 
incorporated after 1
st
 October 2008. In the case of private companies incorporated 
before 1
st
 October 2008, they must pass an ordinary resolution of the shareholders to 
permit authorisation of the director’s conflict of interest by the board. Alternatively, a 
pre-1
st
 October 2008 incorporated private company may alter its articles to empower 
such authorisation. As for private companies formed after 1
st
 October 2008, they are 
entitled to exploit section 175 of the Act without taking any further action, unless the 
articles include a contrary provision. Private companies – whatever the date of 
formation of the company – must also be satisfied that their articles contain no 
provision which invalidates the authorisation of conflicts by directors and so they may 
wish to alter their articles to deal with conflicts of interest. 
 
The case of the plc is governed by section 175(5)(b) of the Act which stipulates that 
authorisation may be given by the directors where the company is a plc and its articles 
include provisions enabling the directors to authorise the conflict. Therefore, plcs will 
require to change their articles to empower the directors to authorise conflicts where 
no such stipulation is contained in their articles. 
 
It is important to stress that authorisation in respect of private companies or plcs 
cannot be given retrospectively. On another note, ICSA
48
 recommends that: - 
 
“… each director should consider if he or she has a conflict of interest through 
a connected person. Therefore it is important that the director informs those 
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individuals that would be regarded as connected persons. A list defining 
connected persons can be found in section 252 of the Act (essentially these are 
certain family members, certain companies with which the director is 
connected, trustees of a trust, certain partners and certain firms with legal 
personality).”
49
 
 
Section 175(6) of the Act states that the authorisation is effective only if any 
requirement as to the quorum at the meeting at which the matter is considered is met 
without counting the director in question or any other interested director and the 
matter was agreed to without their voting or would have been agreed to if their votes 
had not been counted.
50
 For obvious reasons, this rule poses problems for companies 
with sole directors. In such circumstances, the sole director would not be able to 
authorise a potential conflict but the members could be asked to authorise it. The 
position is the same where there are no uninterested directors on the board of 
directors. 
 
Where it is practicable for the interests that may amount to a conflict of interest to be 
authorised by the shareholders, this is likely to be preferable to authorisation by the 
board in the majority of cases. However, for obvious reasons, this will not be 
practicable in the case of a plc or a listed company where shareholder ownership is 
widely dispersed. Nevertheless, the company law sub-committee of the City of 
London solicitors prepared a pro forma circular for listed companies which amends 
the articles of association of listed companies.
51
 One of the benefits of obtaining 
shareholder consent to the directors’ conflict of interest is that shareholder approval 
avoids the necessity for the directors to be concerned about the application and 
exercise of their fiduciary duties. Moreover, if all of the directors have a similar 
conflicting interest, one wonders whether they can properly authorise each others’ 
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interests. Situations giving rise to conflicts can be authorised by the articles of 
association. A standard feature of articles in the past has been a list of permitted 
interests. In essence, the best way for a director to avoid a breach of this fiduciary 
duty is for the relevant conflict to be ratified by the shareholders by ordinary 
resolution in terms of section 239 of the Act. 
Duty No. 6: Duty Not to Accept Benefits from Third Parties – Fiduciary Duty 
Like section 175 of the Act, the Government decided to postpone the coming into 
force of section 176 (duty of directors not to accept benefits from third parties) of the 
Act to 1
st
 October 2008.  Section 176 of the Act sets out a duty on a director not to 
accept a benefit from a third party that is conferred by reason of his position as a 
director or his doing or not doing anything as a director. A third party is defined as a 
person other than the company, an associated body corporate or a person acting on 
behalf of the company or an associate body corporate. Acceptance of such a benefit is 
only permitted if it is authorised in advance by the members by ordinary resolution or 
if it cannot reasonably be regarded as likely to give rise to a conflict of interest. So, 
unlike section 175, benefits received from third parties cannot be authorised by the 
board, but, it will be appropriate to review policies concerning gifts or corporate 
hospitality. Section 176(3) stipulates that benefits received by a director from a person 
by which his services (as a director or otherwise) are provided by the company are not 
regarded as conferred by a third party. 
 
This duty has raised certain alarm as to whether innocent corporate hospitality has 
been outlawed. Essentially, what is important is the nature and extent of the benefit 
received, including matters such as the circumstances in which it is received and 
whether it can be said to involve a conflict. The guidance of ICSA is particularly 
useful here, as follows: - 
 
“This duty has opened up some interesting debates on how far these ‘benefits’ 
may extend. Some benefits are easily identified, such as financial rewards or 
money’s worth such as tickets to prestigious sporting or cultural events. 
Questions have been raised too as to how far this duty will cover the giving or 
receipt of corporate hospitality. Whether the giving or receipt of corporate 
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hospitality may be considered as creating a conflict of interest should be 
decided according to the context in which it is given or received. The 
following situations may be considered: 
 
• If a director is currently involved in negotiating a new contract with 
another person or company and that party offers corporate hospitality it 
may be considered to infringe this duty, although it would depend on 
what was the ‘norm’ and whether it was excessive within the particular 
environment. 
• Proportionate and defensible policies should be developed which 
outline how to deal with benefits offered by or received from third 
parties and which state what levels of corporate entertainment are 
significant for this policy or which need prior authorisation. The 
policies (including any updates) should be approved by the board, 
perhaps on a recommendation from the audit committee. All relevant 
employees and contractors should be informed of the policy and any 
updates and, for the company’s protection, required to sign a receipt 
and acknowledgement to study and comply with the terms of the 
policy and any updates to it. Those forms of receipt and 
acknowledgement should be filed carefully at a central point, such as 
on each employee’s personnel file. 
• It is good practice to set up a register of benefits offered and received 
above whatever level is decided on by the board. It is suggested that 
the company secretary should report annually to the audit committee 
on compliance and issues arising. 
• The Institute of Business Ethics provides practical guidance which 
directors and company secretaries can use to develop policies and 
codes of conduct for their organisations – 
www.ibe.org.uk/codesofconduct.html.”
52
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Therefore, recommended guidance suggests that it would be most prudent for 
companies to set their own limits and parameters as to what constitute acceptable and 
unacceptable benefits in a formal policy document. This ought to approved by the 
board. Whenever a director obtains a benefit, it is recommended that shareholder 
approval be obtained prior to the receipt of the benefit in terms of an ordinary 
resolution under section 239 of the Act. The alternative, which is perhaps more 
attractive, is to persuade the shareholders to pass a special resolution altering the 
articles of association which empowers the directors to receive benefits. What is an 
acceptable or unacceptable benefit would be defined in the articles of association. 
Duty No. 7: Duty to Declare Interest in Proposed Transaction or Arrangement – 
Fiduciary Duty 
Like sections 176-177 of the Act, the Government decided to postpone the coming 
into force of section 177 (duty to declare interest in proposed transaction or 
arrangement with the company) of the Act to 1
st
 October 2008. Section 177(1) of the 
Act provides that if a director is in any way, directly or indirectly, interested in a 
proposed transaction or arrangement with the company, he must declare the nature 
and extent of that interest to the other directors. Where section 177 of the Act applies, 
the directors do not require to comply with section 175. In terms of section 177(4) of 
the Act, such a declaration must be made before the company enters into the 
transaction or arrangement and section 177(2) states that the declaration may be made 
at a board meeting, by notice in writing to the directors in terms of section 184 of the 
Act or general notice in accordance with the stipulations in section 185 of the Act. 
Any failure of the director to make such a declaration amounts to a breach of 
fiduciary duty – it is not a criminal offence
53
 - and so the director may be liable to the 
company for any profits generated in terms of section 178 of the Act. Section 177(3) 
of the Act contains a provision to the effect that if a declaration of interest made 
proves to be, or becomes, inaccurate, a further declaration is required. For a proposed 
arrangement, this is only necessary if the company has not yet entered into it. By 
virtue of section 177(5) of the Act, a director is under no obligation to disclose facts 
                                                 
53
 This can be contrasted with the duty to declare an interest in an existing transaction 
or arrangement under section 182. Here, any failure to make a declaration is a 
criminal offence in terms of section 183 of the Act. 
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of which the other directors should already know or ought reasonably to be presumed 
to know. If a director becomes aware that some of the information declared is not 
accurate or complete before the transaction or arrangement has taken place, he or she 
must ensure that he or she corrects the initial declaration so that it is accurate. 
Moreover, the duty to declare an interest stretches to interests of the director’s 
connected persons, at least where the director ought reasonably to be aware of them. 
So the duty may still apply even if the director is not party to the transaction or 
arrangement, e.g. if the director’s spouse would be entering into the transaction or 
arrangement, the director may need to declare an indirect interest in the transaction. 
 
Section 177 can be contrasted with section 317 of the Companies Act 1985 to the 
effect that a director must declare not only the nature but also the extent of the 
interest. However, in practice, the articles of association of many companies already 
require those companies to make disclosure of the extent as well as the nature of 
permitted interests.  
 
In terms of the transitional provisions in paragraph 48(2) of Schedule 4 to the Fifth 
Commencement Order, section 317 of the Companies Act 1985 continues to apply if 
the duty to declare the interest arose prior to 1
st
 October 2008. Thus, interests in 
current or proposed transactions with the company which exist immediately before 1
st
 
October 2008 but have not already been declared should be declared in accordance 
with section 317. Any failure to make a declaration under section 317 of the 
Companies Act 1985 is a criminal offence. 
 
In terms of section 177(6) of the Act, there are a number of exceptions where the duty 
to declare an interest in a proposed transaction does not apply as follows: - 
 
1. As stated above, if the director is not aware of the interest or where the 
director is not aware of the transaction or arrangement in question (for these 
purposes directors are treated as being aware of matters of which they ought 
reasonably to be aware); 
2. where the transaction or arrangement cannot reasonably be regarded as likely 
to give rise to a conflict of interest; 
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3. if, or to the extent that, the other directors are already aware of it (for these 
purposes they are treated as being aware of anything of which they ought 
reasonably to be aware); or 
4. if, or to the extent that, it concerns terms of the director’s service contract that 
have been or are to be considered by a meeting of the directors or by a 
committee of the directors appointed for the purpose under the company’s 
constitution. 
 
The default position that shareholder approval is required for such declarations will be 
reversed, although in practice many companies already remove the need for members’ 
approval by appropriate wording in their articles. Conversely, some companies may 
wish to retain shareholder approval for such a procedure. 
Duty No. 8: Duty to Declare Interest in Existing Transaction or Arrangement – Non-
fiduciary Duty, but Criminal Offence 
Like sections 175-177 of the Act, the Government decided to postpone the coming 
into force of sections 182 to 187 (duty of directors to declare interest in existing 
transaction or arrangement with the company) of the Act to 1
st
 October 2008. In terms 
of section 182 of the Act, it is provided that if a director is in any way, directly or 
indirectly, interested in an existing transaction or arrangement entered into by the 
company, he must
54
 declare the nature and extent of that interest to the directors (i) at 
a board meeting, (ii) by notice in writing in terms of section 184 or (iii) by general 
notice in terms of section 185, as soon as is reasonably practicable. Any failure to 
make a declaration of such an existing transaction or arrangement is a criminal 
offence.  
 
In terms of the transitional provisions in paragraph 50 of Schedule 4 to the Fifth 
Commencement Order, section 317 of the Companies Act 1985 continues to apply in 
relation to existing transactions or arrangements arising prior to 1
st
 October 2008. For 
the purposes of section 182(1) of the Act, where an interest in an existing transaction 
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was not previously declared under section 177 of the Act, paragraph 50(3) of 
Schedule 4 to the Fifth Commencement Order stipulates that a declaration of interest 
made before 1
st
 October 2008 under section 317 of the Companies Act 1985 is treated 
on and after that date as if it was made under section 177 of the Act. Meanwhile, for 
the purposes of section 182(3) of the Act, where a previous declaration under section 
182(3) of the Act proves to be, or becomes, inadequate, paragraph 50(4) of Schedule 
4 to the Fifth Commencement Order provides that a declaration of interest made 
before 1
st
 October 2008 under section 317 of the Companies Act 1985 is treated on 
and after that date as if it were made under section 182 of the Act. Any failure to 
make a declaration under section 317 of the Companies Act 1985 is a criminal 
offence. 
 
Again, section 182(5) and (6) of the Act provides for situations where a director does 
not require to make disclosure as follows: - 
 
1. If the director is not aware of the interest or where the director is not aware 
of the transaction or arrangement in question (for these purposes directors 
are treated as being aware of matters of which they ought reasonably to be 
aware); 
2. where the transaction or arrangement cannot reasonably be regarded as 
likely to give rise to a conflict of interest; 
3. if, or to the extent that, the other directors are already aware of it (for these 
purposes they are treated as being aware of anything of which they ought 
reasonably to be aware); or 
4. if, or to the extent that, it concerns terms of the director’s service contract 
that have been or are to be considered by a meeting of the directors or by a 
committee of the directors appointed for the purpose under the company’s 
constitution. 
In the case of sole directors, disclosure is not generally required where the company 
only has one (and is permitted to have a sole) director. However, where there is a sole 
director of a company that is required to have more than one director, a declaration 
must be recorded in writing in accordance with section 186(1) of the Act. It is also 
worth noting that a director must also make a declaration under section 182 where a 
declaration has previously been made under section 177 of the Act. This stands to 
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reason since many proposed transactions or arrangements will become existing 
transactions. 
 
As mentioned above, section 184 of the Act enables directors to declare an interest in 
an existing transaction or arrangement with the company by notice in writing. Section 
184(2) states that the directors must send such notice to the other directors where they 
purport to make their declaration in terms of section 184. A section 184 notice may be 
sent in hard copy or electronic form by hand, by post or by agreed electronic means. 
Where a director declares an interest by notice in writing in accordance with section 
184, the making of the declaration forms part of the proceedings at the next meeting 
of the directors after the notice is given and the provisions of section 248 of the Act 
(minutes of meeting of directors) apply as if the declaration had been made at that 
meeting. 
 
The alternative provision, i.e. the provision of general notice, is detailed in section 
185 of the Act. The main difference between the section 185 general notice and the 
section 184 notice in writing is that the former does not involve the production of 
written notice whereas the latter does. Section 185(2) of the Act states that general 
notice is notice given to the directors of a company to the effect that the director: - 
 
(a) has an interest (as member, officer, employee or otherwise) in a 
specified body corporate or firm and is to be regarded as interested in 
any transaction or arrangement that may, after the date of the notice, be 
made with that body corporate or firm, or 
  
(b)  is connected with a specified person (other than a body corporate or 
firm) and is to be regarded as interested in any transaction or 
arrangement that may, after the date of the notice, be made with that 
person. 
 
In terms of section 185(3) of the Act, the notice must state the nature and extent of the 
director’s interest in the body corporate or firm or, as the case may be, the nature of 
his connection with the person. The general notice must be given at a meeting of the 
directors or the director must take reasonable steps to secure that the general notice is 
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brought up and read at the next meeting of the directors after it is given. Otherwise, 
the general notice is deemed to be ineffective. 
Relationship Between the Directors’ Duties 
Is there a hierarchy of duties, with one or others demanding priority over any of the 
others in a particular case where more than one of the duties is relevant? Section 179 
of the Act provides as follows:- 
“Except as otherwise provided, more than one of the general duties may apply 
in any given case.” 
On the face of it, one would assume that section 172 is the primary duty, commanding 
overlordship over the remaining six of the seven duties. Indeed, a number of 
practitioners commentating on the Act have adopted this line. The reason for this is 
that it is clear that the duty to promote the success of the company captures the 
imperative duty of loyalty which goes to the heart of the fiduciary relationship arising 
between the company and its directors. Notwithstanding the views of eminent 
commentators that section 172 is the first among equals, I am not convinced. The 
Explanatory Notes to the Act suggest that no one duty should be thought of as 
superior or inferior to any other in a case where the duties appear to conflict: - 
“Many of the general duties will frequently overlap. Taking a bribe from a 
third party would, for example, clearly fall within the duty not to accept 
benefits from third parties (section 176) but could also, depending on the facts, 
be characterised as a failure to promote the success of the company for the 
benefit of its members (section 172) or as an aspect of failing to exercise 
independent judgment (section 173)… The effect of the duties is cumulative, 
so that it is necessary to comply with every duty that applies in any given case. 
This principle is stated in section 179… The cumulative effect of the duties 
means that where more than one duty applies, the director must comply with 
each applicable duty, and the duties must be read in this context. So, for 
example, the duty to promote the success of the company will not authorise 
the director to breach his duty to act within his powers, even if he considers 
that it would be most likely to promote the success of the company. As well as 
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complying with all the duties, the directors must continue to comply with all 
other applicable laws. The duties do not require or authorise a director to 
breach any other prohibition or requirement imposed on him by law.”
55
 
Thus, where a decision taken is likely to promote the success of the company but will 
breach another of the duties, the authority of section 172 will not operate to cure the 
breach of the other duty. This quite clearly means that section 172 cannot be viewed 
as a primary duty in such a case.  
Nevertheless, there is an argument amongst commentators that the duty to promote 
the success of the company in section 172 will be elevated in particular situations to 
operate as a ‘tie-breaker’, e.g. where a course of action adopted by a director breaches 
one of the other duties (e.g. section 171) yet is nevertheless compliant with one of the 
other duties (e.g. section 173). In such a scenario, there may be a possibility that the 
courts will use section 172 as a yardstick by which to judge the director’s decision.
56
 
If this argument is correct, then in this particular scenario section 172 could be seen as 
a primary duty. However, I am sceptical of this argument, since if a duty has been 
breached, yet the decision resulting in such breach is nevertheless compliant with the 
director’s duty to promote success, I still cannot see a court relieving the director of 
liability. A duty has been breached, so surely the director is liable notwithstanding 
that the decision promotes the success of the company? 
The upshot of all this is that directors will require to exercise great care in taking 
decisions where more than one of the duties is relevant. 
Relationship Between the Directors’ Duties and the Company’s Constitution 
Under section 171 of the Act, a director must act in accordance with the company’s 
constitution. However, companies may, through their articles of association, go 
further than the statutory duties by placing more onerous requirements on their 
directors (e.g. by requiring shareholder authorisation of the remuneration of the 
directors). The articles may not dilute the duties except to the extent that this is 
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permitted by the following sections of the Act which came into force on 1
st
 October 
2007: - 
• Section 173 provides that a director will not be in breach of the duty to 
exercise independent judgment if he has acted in a way that is authorised by 
the constitution; 
• Subsection (4)(a) of section 180 preserves any rule of law enabling the 
company to give authority for anything that would otherwise be a breach of 
duty; 
• Subsection (4)(b) of section 180 provides that a director will not be in breach 
of duty if he acts in accordance with any provisions in the company’s articles 
for dealing with conflicts of interest; 
• Section 232 places restrictions on the provisions that may be included in the 
company’s articles. However, nothing in that section prevents companies from 
including in their articles any such provisions as are currently lawful for 
dealing with conflicts of interest. 
Remedies for Breach of Directors’ Duties 
Section 178 of the Act provides as follows: - 
“(1) The consequences of breach (or threatened breach) of sections 171 to 174 
are the same as would apply if the corresponding common law rule or 
equitable principle applied. 
(2) The duties in those sections (with the exception of section 174 (duty to 
exercise reasonable care, skill and diligence)) are, accordingly, enforceable in 
the same way as any other fiduciary duty owed to a company by its directors.” 
In the case of fiduciary duties (i.e. all of the statutory duties with the exception of 
sections 174 and 182-187 of the Act), the consequences of breach may include: - 
• Damages or compensation where the company has suffered loss; 
• Restoration of the company’s property; 
• An account of profits made by the director, i.e. gain-based damages; and 
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• Rescission of a contract where the director failed to disclose an interest. 
Thus, the common law continues to apply. In the case of a breach of section 174, only 
the remedy of damages will be available and the others are irrelevant. 
Ratification 
The company may wish to ratify a director’s conduct where that amounts to a breach 
of duty. Section 239 of the Act permits this. Nevertheless, there are certain anti-
avoidance provisions. Any votes held by a director in breach, or any member 
connected with him, are not to be taken into account. Bodies corporate in which the 
director and any persons connected with him together have broadly a 20% interest in 
the equity or the voting rights are connected with a director for this purpose. 
Ratification may not be possible where a holding company is asked to ratify the acts 
of a director of its subsidiary company and the director has a material interest in the 
holding company. 
Moreover, in the recent decision of the High Court in England in Franbar Holdings 
Ltd. v Patel,
57
 it was held that the wording of section 239(7) of the Act is ineffective 
to exclude the common law of ratification. Therefore, the following acts are not 
ratifiable by the company: - 
• Acts which are ultra vires the company in the strict sense; and 
• Any other acts which, pursuant to any common law rule of law, are incapable 
of being ratified for some other reason, e.g. acts of the directors of the 
company which are so bad that it is clear that they cannot be ratified by the 
shareholders. A good example is provided by the case of Cook v Deeks
58
 
where the directors of a company diverted in their own individual favour 
business which should properly have been given to, and belonged to, the 
company of which they were directors. 
In other words, the old common law rules on the ratifiability of conduct taken by the 
directors continue to apply. 
                                                 
57
 [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch); [2008] All ER (D) 14 (Jul). 
58
 [1916] 1 AC 554. 
 45 
The Regulation of Substantial Property Transactions 
Sections 190 to 196 of the Act replace sections 320 to 322 of the Companies Act 
1985. They require members’ approval to substantial property transactions by 
ordinary resolution, i.e. transactions where the company sells or buys a substantial 
non-cash asset to or from: 
• A director of the company; 
• A director of a company’s holding company; 
• A person connected with a director of the company; or 
• A person connected with a director of the company’s holding company. 
Where the director or connected person is a director of the company’s holding 
company or a person connected with such a director, the arrangement must also have 
been approved by a resolution of the members of the holding company or be 
conditional on such approval being obtained. With regard to the identity of persons 
who are ‘connected persons’, the new rules in the Act cover a director’s civil partner 
and adult children and step-children, the director’s parents, a person living with the 
director ‘as partner in an enduring family relationship’ and any children or step-
children under 18 of such a person who are not also the director’s children or step-
children. 
The main difference between section 190 of the Act and the corresponding provisions 
in the Companies Act 1985 is that a company is permitted to enter into a contract 
which is conditional on member approval. This contrasts with the requirements of the 
Companies Act 1985 which provide that members’ approval is required before the 
contract is signed. It implements a recommendation of the Law Commissions and the 
effect is that the company is not to be held liable under the contract if member 
approval is not forthcoming. 
Section 1163 of the Act provides that a ‘non-cash asset’ means any property or 
interest in property, other than cash. Section 191 defines a ‘substantial non-cash asset’ 
as an asset whose value (i) exceeds 10% of the company’s asset value and is more 
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than £5,000
59
 or (ii) exceeds £100,000. ‘Asset value’, in turn, is defined as (i) the 
value of the company’s net assets determined by reference to its most recent statutory 
accounts, or (ii) if no statutory accounts have been prepared, the amount of the 
company’s called-up share capital. 
The consequences of failing to comply with section 190 are purely civil in nature by 
virtue of the terms of section 195 of the Act – NB the absence of criminal penalties. 
Thus, the arrangement, and any transaction entered into in pursuance of the 
arrangement is voidable at the instance of the company, unless- 
• Restitution of any money or other asset that was the subject matter of the 
arrangement or transaction is no longer possible, 
• The company has been indemnified in pursuance of section 195 of the Act by 
any other persons for the loss or damage suffered by it, or 
• Rights acquired in good faith, for value and without actual notice of the 
contravention by a person who is not a party to the arrangement or transaction 
would be affected by the avoidance. 
Whether or not the arrangement or any such transaction has been avoided, each of the 
following persons is liable (i) to account to the company for any gain that he has made 
directly or indirectly by the arrangement or transaction, and (ii) (jointly and severally) 
to indemnify the company for any loss or damage resulting from the arrangement or 
transaction: - 
• Any director of the company or its holding company with whom the company 
entered into the arrangement in contravention of section 190 of the Act, 
• Any person with whom the company entered into the arrangement in 
contravention of section 190 of the Act who is connected with a director of the 
company or its holding company, 
• The director of the company or of its holding company with whom any such 
person is connected, and 
• Any other director of the company who authorised the arrangement or any 
transaction entered into in pursuance of such an arrangement. 
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It is important to note that a director will not be liable in terms of the third bullet point 
above if he can demonstrate that he took all reasonable steps to secure the company’s 
compliance with section 190 of the Act. Moreover, where a transaction or 
arrangement is entered into by a company in contravention of section 190 of the Act 
but, within a reasonable period, it is affirmed by ordinary resolution of the members 
of the company and/or the members of the company’s holding company (if 
applicable), then the transaction or arrangement may no longer be avoided under the 
rules outlined above. 
Other differences between the Act and the Companies Act 1985 are as follows: - 
• Provision is made for the aggregation of non-cash assets forming part of any 
arrangement or series of arrangements for the purpose of determining whether 
the financial thresholds have been exceeded so that member approval is 
required – see section 190(5) of the Act; 
• Payments under directors’ service contracts and payments for loss of office are 
excluded from the requirements of these sections (section 190(6) of the Act) – 
which was a recommendation of the Law Commissions; 
• Exceptions for transactions with members have been expanded to include the 
acquisition of assets from a person in his capacity as a member of the 
company – section 192(a);  
• As noted above, the scope of persons caught by the ‘connected persons’ test 
has been considerably expanded; and 
• No approval is required on the part of the members of a company that is in 
administration or is being wound up (unless it is a members’ voluntary 
winding-up) – see section 193. 
Contracts with Sole members who are Directors 
Section 231 of the Act applies to the situation where a limited company having only 
one member enters into a contract with the sole member - which is not in the ordinary 
course of business of the company. Here, the company must, unless the contract is in 
writing, ensure that the terms of the contract are either: - 
• set out in a written memorandum; or 
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• recorded in the minutes of the first meeting of the directors of the company 
following the making of the contract. 
Any failure to comply with section 231 of the Act is a criminal offence, but the 
contract is not deprived of validity. 
 
C. STATUTORY DERIVATIVE PROCEEDINGS 
The Act provides that the general duties of directors are owed to the company, rather 
than to individual members – see section 170(1) of the Act. It follows that, as now, 
only the company can enforce them provided that loss has been suffered by the 
company as a result of the breach. There are currently three main ways in which the 
company can take legal action against a director (or more commonly, a former 
director) for breach of duty: - 
• If the board of directors decides to commence proceedings; 
• If the liquidator or administrator following the commencement of a formal 
insolvency procedure such as liquidation or administration decides to 
commence proceedings; or 
• A derivative claim or action brought by one or more of the members to 
enforce a right which is vested not in himself, but in the company. 
In this part, we are concerned with the last of these avenues. 
With regard to derivative proceedings in Scotland, the current position is that the 
member’s right to raise such proceedings is conferred by the common law. Therefore, 
a member has title as a matter of substantive law to raise proceedings by petition 
procedure in respect of a director’s breach of duty to obtain a remedy for the 
company. Such proceedings are raised in the name of the member but the remedy is 
obtained for the benefit of the company and the rights which the member can enforce 
against a director or third party are those of the company. The member’s right arises 
where the proceedings complained of are fraudulent or ultra vires and so cannot be 
validated by a majority of the members of the company. This remedy is not available 
if the majority of members acting in good faith have validated or may validate the act 
complained of. 
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There are two current rules of substance which apply to actions brought by the 
member to protect the company’s interests (as well as to actions brought to protect the 
shareholder’s personal interests such as enforcement of rights in the articles of 
association). First, the directors of a company owe duties to the company and not to 
the members. Second, the court will not interfere in matters of internal management 
which may be sanctioned by a majority of the members. The effect of these rules is 
similar to the first two legs of the common law rule in Foss v Harbottle.
60
 
Sections 265 to 269 of the Act place the derivative action on a statutory footing in 
Scots law. The relevant rules applicable to the law of England and Wales are 
contained in sections 260-264 – the rules for England and Wales and Scotland are the 
same in substance. The main difference is the terminology. In Scotland, the 
proceedings are called ‘derivative proceedings’, whereas in England and Wales, they 
are known as ‘derivative claims.’ For the purposes of this presentation, we will 
concentrate on sections 265-269 of the Act which apply to Scotland, but it is worth 
bearing in the mind that the equivalent provisions applicable to England and Wales 
contained in sections 260-264 are in more or less identical terms. 
Section 265 provides that a member
61
 of a company may raise an action in respect of 
certain acts or omissions in order to protect the interests of the company and obtain a 
remedy on its behalf. The specified actions or omissions may be actual or proposed
62
 
and are as follows: - 
• Negligence, default, breach of duty or breach of trust by a director63 of the 
company. 
Such ‘derivative proceedings’ may be raised against the director or some other 
person. Who will be ‘some other person’? What this means is that derivative 
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 (1843) 2 Hare 461. 
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 ‘Member of a company’ in this context includes a person who is not a member but 
to whom shares in the company have been transferred or transmitted by operation of 
law. 
62
 The actions or omissions are defined in the Act as the ‘cause of action.’ 
63
 ‘Director’ includes former directors or shadow directors. 
 50 
proceedings can be taken against persons involved in a breach of duty by a director. 
For example, in proceedings concerning the transfer of funds by a director in breach 
of trust, the proceedings may also be brought against the recipient who has knowledge 
of their source or nature. 
Moreover, the statutory proceedings are additional to, rather than a replacement for, 
the rights of a member (i) under section 994 of the Act (i.e. the unfair prejudice 
remedy), (ii) section 122(1)(g) of the Insolvency Act 1986 (just and equitable winding 
up) or (iii) conferred personally upon them as a matter of contract under the articles of 
association, a shareholders agreement or on some other contractual basis. 
A member may only raise derivative proceedings if they have obtained the leave of 
the court. In terms of the Companies Bill (as introduced), there was a separate 
requirement for the member to give notice of the claim to the company, but this has 
been deleted from the final version of the Companies Act 2006. 
An application for the leave of the court must: - 
• Specify the cause of action; and 
• Summarise the facts on which the derivative proceedings are to be based;  
The Court may: - 
• Grant the application on such terms as it thinks fit; 
• Refuse the application; or 
• Adjourn the proceedings on the application and make such order as to further 
procedure as it thinks fit. 
The Act provides that the court must refuse leave to raise derivative proceedings if it 
is satisfied that: - 
• A person acting in accordance with the director’s duty to promote the success 
of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, would not seek to 
raise or continue the claim; or 
• Where the cause of action is an act or omission that is yet to occur, that the act 
or omission has been authorised by the company; or 
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• Where the cause of action is an act or omission that has already occurred, that 
the act or omission (i) was authorised by the company before it occurred, or 
(ii) has been ratified by the company since it occurred. 
In considering whether to grant leave to raise derivative proceedings, the court must 
take into account the following criteria: - 
• Whether the member is acting in good faith in seeking to raise the 
proceedings; 
• The importance that a person acting in good faith in accordance with the 
director’s duty to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole, would attach to raising or continuing it;
64
 
• Where the cause of action is an act or omission that is yet to occur, whether 
the act or omission could be, and in the circumstances would likely to be (i) 
authorised by the company before it occurs, or (ii) ratified by the company 
after it occurs;
65
 
• Where the cause of action is an act or omission that has already occurred, 
whether the act or omission could be, and in the circumstances would be likely 
to be, ratified by the company; 
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 This was the subject of discussion in Franbar Holdings Ltd. v Patel [2008] EWHC 
1534 (Ch); [2008] All ER (D) 14 (Jul). ‘Good faith’ is likely to be an issue in the case 
of a special interest group such as the environmental lobby who has bought shares in 
the company simply for the purpose of raising proceedings to challenge a director’s 
actions or decisions. The same point applies in the case of a takeover situation, where 
the directors of the target company reject a bid without offering it to the shareholders 
and the offeror brings derivative proceedings to challenge this decision and thus 
ratchet up the pressure on the board. 
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 The fact that an act or omission is ratifiable no longer precludes derivative 
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considering whether leave should be granted. However, if a breach of duty has been 
authorised or ratified, leave must be refused. Again, whether a breach of duty was 
capable of ratification was considered by the High court in Franbar Holdings Ltd. v 
Patel [2008] EWHC 1534 (Ch); [2008] All ER (D) 14 (Jul). 
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• Whether the company has decided not to raise proceedings in respect of the 
same cause of action or to persist in the proceedings (as the case may be); and 
• Whether the cause of action is one in respect of which the member could raise 
an action in his own right rather than on behalf of the company. 
Finally, in considering whether to grant leave to raise derivative proceedings, the 
court must have regard to any evidence before it as to the views of members of the 
company who have no personal interest, direct or indirect, in the matter (i.e. the 
passive members). The Secretary of State has the power to make regulations altering 
or adding to any of the above criteria. 
The Act includes ‘continuation’ and ‘substitution’ procedures, whereby a member can 
apply to (i) have existing proceedings raised by a company continued in his own 
personal name where such proceedings are being conducted in a manner which 
amounts to an abuse of the process of the court, or has been pursued far from 
diligently or reluctantly, etc. and/or (ii) be substituted to derivative proceedings where 
another member of the company has commenced such proceedings in respect of a 
cause of action, but has pursued the proceedings far from diligently or reluctantly. 
The individual member must satisfy the court that: - 
• The manner in which the company commenced or continued the proceedings 
amounts to an abuse of the court process; or 
• The company has failed to prosecute the proceedings in a diligent fashion; or 
• It is appropriate for the member to be substituted for the company. 
Moreover, where a member has initiated the derivative proceedings or been 
substituted by the court (for the company) in terms of the above procedure, another 
member may seek authority from the court to be substituted for such member. The 
same criteria apply. In other words, the individual member must satisfy the court that: 
- 
• The manner in which the member commenced or continued the proceedings 
amounts to an abuse of the court process; or 
• The member has failed to prosecute the proceedings in a diligent fashion; or 
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• It is appropriate for the member to be substituted for the member.66 
Commentary 
The statutory derivative proceedings are likely to form a good basis for enforcing a 
breach of a director’s duty. However, an important factor which might prevent the use 
of statutory derivative proceedings in Scotland is the position with regard to the 
expenses of the member initiating the proceedings. There is nothing in the Companies 
Act 2006 which provides that a member will be entitled to reimbursement of their 
expenses from the company. There is such a procedure available in England and 
Wales – but not in Scotland. 
My own feeling is that the impact of the statutory derivative proceedings will be 
marginal. There are three reasons for this. Firstly, in Scotland, the (currently) unclear 
position with regard to the recovery of a member’s expenses will repel members from 
instigating proceedings. Secondly, I suspect that where a shareholder is aggrieved 
about the way they have been treated by the company or the directors, their preferred 
option is likely to be a s. 994 petition which enables them to effect an ‘exit’ by 
obtaining an order from the court sanctioning the majority to buy out their shares at 
‘fair value’. In most situations, a ‘buy out’ of their shares and an exit is likely to be 
more attractive than seeking to recover assets or funds on behalf of the company. 
Finally, the leave of court procedure will screen claims and is likely to ‘weed out’ 
vexatious proceedings and so, members may be deterred from initiating statutory 
derivative proceedings in the first place. 
D. STATUTORY ‘UNFAIR PREJUDICE’ REMEDY 
Section 994(1) of the Act enables a member to petition the court to declare that the 
company’s affairs are being conducted in an unfairly prejudicial manner to the 
members generally or to particular members. The ‘unfair prejudice’ remedy enables a 
minority shareholder to take action against (a) the majority shareholders where the 
latter have abused their position or (b) the directors where they have breached their 
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 These ‘Substitution’ procedures were introduced into the Bill on 27
th
 February 2006 
by the Attorney-General (Lord Goldsmith) in committee of the House of Lords. 
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duties in terms of sections 171-177 of the Act. Section 994 of the Act differs from the 
statutory derivative proceedings in that (i) the remedies available are wider, (ii) the 
remedies may be awarded to the successful petitioner rather than the company and 
(iii) unlike, the statutory derivative proceedings, the wrongdoing may have been 
perpetrated by persons other than the directors, e.g. the majority shareholders. The 
precise terms of section 994 are as follows: - 
“A member of a company may apply to the court by petition for an order… on 
the ground—  
(a)  that the company’s affairs are being or have been conducted in a 
manner that is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of members 
generally or of some part of its members (including at least himself), or  
(b)  that an actual or proposed act or omission of the company (including 
an act or omission on its behalf) is or would be so prejudicial.” 
 
If the petition is successful, the court has the power to: 
• Order the company to carry out certain acts or refrain from doing or 
continuing an act – including ordering the company to sue for a wrong done; 
• Prevent the company from carrying out certain acts; 
• Order members of the company to buy the shares of the prejudiced members, 
at a fair price; or 
• Make any order which it sees fit.67 
 
In practice, the lion’s share of minority shareholders presenting a petition before the 
court will be seeking an exit from the company by obtaining an order from the court 
for their shares to be bought by the majority shareholders or the company at a fair 
price. In the case law, the courts have provided a number of examples of unfair 
prejudice, e.g. the non-payment of dividends,
68
 the exclusion of a shareholder from 
the management of the company without offering a reasonable fair value for his/her 
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 S. 996 of the Act. 
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 Re Sam Weller & Sons Ltd [1990] Ch 682, p 693; Grace v Biagoli [2005] EWCA 
Civ 122, [2006] 2 BCLC 70. 
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shares,
69
 excessive remuneration of directors,
70
 sanctioning a rights issue which the 
minority are unable to afford,
71
 loading the board of directors which persons opposed 
to the good of the company,
72
 issuing new shares below their par/nominal value
73
 and 
a delay in holding a general meeting.
74
  
 
The most important case on the scope of the court’s jurisdiction is the House of Lords 
case of O’Neill v Phillips.
75
 This case demonstrated that a complaining shareholder 
must be able to point to a breach of some settled or tacit understanding (which he/she 
had with the remaining shareholders or directors in the company) which has been 
breached. Such an understanding may be contained in writing in the company’s 
constitution or may be discovered by oral evidence. In practice, most of the reported 
cases concern the latter situation which requires the shareholder to prove the 
‘understanding’ in evidence in court (which the shareholder alleges has been 
breached), since in a case where the expectation and rights of the shareholder are 
written in black and white in the constitution, there is little purpose in the company 
disputing the claim. Furthermore, the requirement to demonstrate the existence of 
such a settled or tacit understanding renders the section 994 remedy almost practically 
useless in the case of a public limited company whose shares are listed on the London 
Stock Exchange: - 
 
“In my judgment, as the authorities stand today, the [remedy] can have no 
place in the context of public listed companies. Moreover, its introduction 
in that context would, as it seems to me, in all probability prove to be a 
recipe for chaos. If the market in a company's shares is to have any 
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credibility members of the public dealing in that market must it seems to 
me be entitled to proceed on the footing that the constitution of the 
company is as it appears in the company's public documents, unaffected by 
any extraneous equitable considerations and constraints.”
76

 
This stands to reason, since the courts generally take the view that a shareholder has 
the option of selling his/her shares in the event that he/she is unhappy about the way 
the company is being run. However, in the case of private companies, no such market 
for the shares will usually exist and hence the reason why the courts are more 
prepared to intervene in such contexts. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
 
The UK Government has sought to trace a ‘middle path’ or ‘third way’ between the 
extremes of the ‘shareholder primacy’ and ‘pluralist/stakeholder’ approaches in 
framing the new law on directors’ duties in UK company law. This has been achieved 
by invoking or creating the ‘enlightened shareholder value’ approach. At the heart of 
this notion is an acceptance that the company should be run for the long-term rather 
than short-term benefit of the shareholders as a whole (past, present and future) duly 
allied with a recognition that some consideration must be given to the interests of 
outside constituencies or factors such as the good of the environment, the public, 
creditors, suppliers, employees, etc. The UK Government’s expectation and aspiration 
is that this will move directors away from taking decisions whose sole purpose is the 
achievement of short-term benefits for shareholders, (e.g. decisions purely motivated 
by a concern with the maintenance of, and/or increase in, dividend payments year on 
year) with greater consideration of decisions which will benefit the company in the 
long-term and not unduly trample on the interests of third parties. It is submitted that 
whether this (1) expectation is realisable and (2) aspiration is achievable, has been 
assisted by the events of the past month or so in the international banking sector. 
Indeed, one of the likely responses of governments internationally is to highlight 
existing laws such as the law of directors’ duties in the UK which focus strongly on 
long-term corporate growth at the expense of short-term performance. Moreover, it is 
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equally likely that a new international regulatory environment will be erected which 
builds on the law of directors’ duties by striking this same message of long-term 
thinking. 
